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INTRODUCTION
By the 2000 election year and 'continuing into the 2002 election
year, most legitimate political candidates, whether in national or local
elections, had a Web site.' Virtually every politically active person,
group, committee, union, association, and corporation relied on the
Internet to provide and receive everything from election information
1. George W. Bush, Al Gore, Bill Bradley, and John McCain all had Web sites in
support of their 2000 presidential campaigns. See http://www.politicalinformation.com
(last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (providing a
search engine for Web sites for national, state, and local candidates). Even local
candidates post campaign information on the Internet. For example, Danny Long,
candidate for Pender County, North Carolina Sheriff, and Cameron DeJong, candidate for
Beaufort County, North Carolina Commissioner, had Web sites promoting their 2002
campaigns. http://www.longforsheriff.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); http://votecam.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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to campaign money.2 Governments used the Internet for direct
voting.3 Individuals used the Internet to make their positions on
elections and political issues known, in some cases for the first time.4
Political campaigns used the Internet to advertise positions on
campaign issues, to communicate directly with core constituents, to
attract new supporters, to communicate via e-mail, and, most
importantly, to raise money.5 New technology created questions
regarding the applicability of federal election law to Internet activity.
Most of the emerging issues center on whether a candidate or
political party, through the Internet activities of others, receives
something of value.6 Secondary questions consider how to determine
that value, when to report Internet activities, and what responsibility
the candidate or party has upon receipt of benefits.7 This Comment
takes the position that Internet activities impart value to political
candidates even if the "value" cannot be easily defined or calculated
like monetary contributions. Furthermore, this Comment argues that
difficulty in calculating value should not be used by the federal
government as an excuse for failing to reform the current campaign
finance rules.
First, this Comment discusses the current campaign finance laws
in general.8 Second, this Comment reviews the original approach of
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to Internet regulation under
the laws.9 Finally, this Comment considers the constitutionality of the
proposed FEC Internet rules and whether the rules properly regulate
Internet activities by individuals, corporations, and labor unions. 10
2. Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, Election Law and the Internet, 3, at http://www.
brookings.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/sourcebk0l/InternetChap.pdf (Nov. 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. For example, some Internet sites, such as AOL and Washingtonpost.com,
provide moderated chat rooms for users. Vlae Kershner, Finding Serious Political
Discourse Among All the Online Illiteracy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2000, at A8. Web-surfers
can also participate in online polls on elections and issues. Id. Some Internet companies
collect public information and sell those databases directly to the campaigns and
corporations. Rebecca Fairley Raney, For-Profit Web Sites Give New Meaning to
Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at C4. Some individuals also use the
Internet to learn about political issues and election positions. A survey by George
Washington University found that one-fourth of the U.S. population receives political
campaign information from Web sites. Id.
5. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,360 (proposed Nov. 5,
1999) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 102-04, 106-07, 109-10,114, 116).
7. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 3.
8. See infra notes 11-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 79-193 and accompanying text.
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This analysis as a whole will lead to the ultimate conclusion that FEC
involvement is necessary.
I. BACKGROUND ON ELECTION LAW DEALING WITH CAMPAIGN
FINANCE,
A. Current State of the Law
In order to level the playing field in federal elections, Congress
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)." FECA
is designed to accomplish this by limiting contributions to national
candidates and parties and by restricting the contributions and
expenditures of corporations, labor unions, and other politically
motivated groups. 2 Under FECA, "contribution" is defined to
specifically include dollar donations and other items clearly coming
under the umbrella of "contributions."13  FECA goes further,
however, by also including "anything of value" given to a federal
candidate or committee in the definition of contribution. 4 The broad
definition gives the FEC, the agency in charge of enforcing the
statute, 5 extensive regulatory authority in this area. 6 Under FECA's
contribution definition, limits on direct financial contributions, loans,
loan guarantees, in kind contributions of office space and equipment,
and payment of fundraising expenses or salaries to a candidate's
workers are all covered activities that the FEC has the power to
regulate. 7
FECA granted the FEC the power to regulate the contributions
of both individuals and corporations. FECA limits individual
11. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-42 (2000)).
12. The primary purpose of FECA is "to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions." Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 26 (1976). FECA represents a total revision of prior law because previous
reporting requirements were inadequate to keep the electorate informed as to the source
of political campaign money. See Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
13. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2000).
14. § 431(8)(A)(i)-(ii). A contribution is "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing
any election for Federal office." Id.
15. Id. § 437c(b)(1).
16. See § 431(8)(A) (defining "contribution" broadly); see also Trevor Potter, Where
Are We Now? The Current State of Campaign Finance Law, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 5, 5-8 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997) (listing items
considered contributions under the broad FECA definition), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/gs/cf/sourcebk/chapl.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM].
17. § 431(8)(A).
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campaign contributions by regulating the dollar amount that can be
donated per year and peri election. 8 For corporations, however, the
restrictions cover a broader range of activities. The main prohibition
is that a corporation cannot use corporate funds in connection with a
federal election.19
A corporation may engage in a number of permissible activities.
It can use corporate funds to communicate its political views via e-
mail, newsletter, or bulletin board with its restricted class20 at any
time on any subject, including partisan politics.21 A corporation may
also establish a Political Action Committee2 2 ("PAC") or a "Separate
18. Individuals can give $1,000 to a candidate to support her election campaign. Id.
§ 441a(a)(1)(A). In addition individuals can donate $20,000 per year to the federal
account of a national party committee and $5,000 per year to any other multi-candidate
federal political group including a Political Action Committee (PAC). § 441a(a)(1)(B)-
(C). All contributions are subject to a $25,000 aggregate limit per calendar year.
§ 441a(a)(3). These limits have recently increased with the passage of House Bill 2356,
but the new limits did not take effect until after the 2002 election. Trevor Potter & Kirk L.
Jowers, Summary Analysis of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act Passed by House
and Senate and Sent to President, at http://www.brookings.org/dybdocroot/gs/cf/headlines/
FinalApproval.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
19. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 4.
20. This class includes paid members of the Board of Directors, salaried
administrative personnel who have policymaking, professional, managerial, or supervisory
responsibilities, shareholders in the company, and the families of these individuals.
Definitions, 11 C.F.R. § 114.10) (2002). The corporation cannot contact employees
represented by unions, outside professionals, and attorneys retained by the company.
Disbursements for communications beyond the restricted class in connection with a
Federal election, Id. § 114.3.
21. § 114.3(c).
22. Under FECA,
The term "political committee" means-
(A) any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives
contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which
makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year; or
(B) any separate segregated fund established under the provisions of section
441b(b) of this title; or
(C) any local committee of a political party which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments
exempted from the definition of contribution or expenditure as defined in
paragraphs (8) and (9) aggregating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or
makes contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or
makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.
2 U.S.C. § 431(4). PACs are political committees that qualify for multi-candidate
committee status under 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(3) (2002). These committees are allowed to
contribute more per candidate, per election. PACs may be either independent or
connected to a corporation or labor organization. See Affiliated committee, 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.5(g)(2) (2002) (stating all corporate and union PACs are "affiliated"); § 100.5(e)(1)-
(5) (listing types of PACs). Corporate connected PACs are limited to soliciting
contributions from their restricted class. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that a
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Segregated Fund" to enable it to engage in political activity otherwise
prohibited by federal law.3 A corporation may solicit voluntary
contributions from certain employees for use by, the PAC, which can
in turn be used by the PAC for federal political purposes.24
FECA created the FEC specifically to administer and enforce
the provisions of the Act .The FEC is statutorily authorized to
"seek to obtain compliance with" and "formulate policy with respect
to" the provisions of FECA.26  The FEC has the power to initiate
court actions, order testimony, render advisory opinions, conduct
hearings, and make rules to enforce FECA (and various other
provisions of the United States Code).27 However, the creation of the
FEC does not remove or impede any of the authority of the U.S.
Congress, or any of its committees, with respect to federal election
law. 8
Federal election law is broadly written to cover all money spent
in connection with or "for the purpose of influencing" federal
elections. 29 But the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of FECA in
Buckley v. Valeo.3 ° While upholding the constitutionality of the limits
on campaign contributions imposed by FECA,31 Buckley invalidated
provisions limiting campaign expenditures.32 According to Buckley,
any activity restricted by federal election laws must be narrowly and
clearly defined so it cannot "chill" speech protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.33 Furthermore, clear
policy statements regarding federal regulation must give speakers
corporation is permitted to make only two written solicitations per calendar year of
employees not in the restricted class and that such solicitations are rare because they are
burdensome and often unsuccessful).
23. These funds are established pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B).
24. § 441b.
25. Id. § 437c(a)(1), (b)(1).
26. § 437c(b)(1).
27. § 437d(a)(1)-(9). The advisory opinion process has been instrumental in the
formulation of FEC policy with regard to the Internet. Any time a person submits a
written request to the FEC seeking a declaration of FECA's applicability with respect to a
specific activity, the FEC must render an advisory opinion within sixty days (or twenty
days for federal candidates). § 437f(a)(1)-(2). Thereafter, any party to the transaction or
any other person acting under the exact same facts may rely on that decision, and act
according to the decision, so long as he or she does so in good faith. § 437f(c).
28. § 437c(b)(2).
29. Id. § 431(8)(A) (providing the definition of "campaign contribution" for purposes
of the Act).
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 58-59.
33. Potter, supra note 16, at 5.
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adequate notice to ensure that they are able to comply with
requirements prospectively."4
The main effect of Buckley is the limitation of the scope of the
statutory language of FECA. The limitations on political activity and
the definitions of covered activities in the language of FECA are
extremely broad; Buckley serves to. narrowly tailor ,the federal
election laws so as not to restrict protected speech. The limitations
provided by Buckley create the framework for discussing campaign
finance regulation including the Internet regulations considered
hereafter.
B. Campaign Finance Laws That Affect Internet Politics
1. General U.S. Position on Regulation of the Internet
According to the U.S. Congress, the Internet and other
interactive computer services should remain unfettered by federal or
state regulation to preserve the competitive free market that exists
there.35 The notion is that the Internet, in order to reach its full
capability as a medium for information transfer, must be free from all
obstruction.36  Most federal agencies have adhered to the
congressional directive when considering regulations.37 The Internet,
for the most part, has thus remained free of encumbrances.
38
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,39 the Supreme Court
agreed with the general federal policy towards the Internet:
Government interference should be limited in order to help maintain
advancement of the Internet as an informational and commercial
avenue.40 The Court characterized the Internet as "a unique and
34. 424 U.S. at 76-77, 79-80.
35. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000)). Congress noted that the developing array of Internet services
increased the availability of educational resources for U.S. citizens, and created a forum
for diverse political, cultural, and intellectual discourse, and that these services flourished
because of minimal government interference. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2000).
36. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 2.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON BROADBAND
INTERNET ACCESS, BROADBAND TODAY 41 (1999) ("The Commission [should] forbear
from imposing regulation[s] and continue to resist the urge to regulate prematurely."),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/ Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
39. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
40. See id. at 868-69 (noting that other broadcast media have specific attributes that
justify regulation whereas the Internet does not have these attributes).
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wholly new medium of worldwide human communication"41 with no
single individual or organization in control.42
In striking down the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA")4 on First Amendment grounds,44 the Court confirmed that
Internet communications deserve a higher level of First Amendment
protection than television or radio communications. The reasons for
extensive regulation of broadcast media, specifically the history of
regulation, scarcity of space available for transmission, and invasive
nature of the medium, are not present in the Internet context.45
Unlike broadcast media where a finite number of networks determine
the content sent over the frequency, the Internet is more akin to a
group of individuals sitting in a room talking; anyone with a computer
and modem can put a message online. The Reno Court firmly held
that because the Internet is like a worldwide soapbox where any
person with a phone line can spread his message to the masses, First
Amendment protections are absolutely essential.46 Unlike television
and radio, there is no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment protections with regard to the Internet. 47  The Court
held that the broad coverage of the CDA "unquestionably silences
some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional
protection.
' 48
The holding in Reno has undoubtedly shaped the federal
government's policy towards the Internet. By providing the Internet
with the utmost First Amendment protection, the Court has ensured
that very little congressional or agency regulation can constrain the
content found online. The FEC must abide by this mandate in its
attempts to regulate Internet political activity in accordance with
FECA.
41. Id. at 850 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824,844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
42. Id. at 853.
43. The CDA prohibited displaying or transmitting obscene messages to minor
persons and was enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 223(a), (d) (2002).
44. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-75 (stating that the CDA lacks the precision required by the
First Amendment when a statute regulates free speech).
45. The Court held that the Internet is not as invasive because affirmative steps are
required after turning on one's computer before any content is seen on the screen.
Furthermore, users seldom encounter content by accident. Id. at 868-70.
46. Id. at 870.
47. Id. at 868-69.
48. Id. at 874.
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2. FEC Approach to Internet Regulation
In contrast to other federal.,government entities, the FEC has
taken an active approach to'the applicability of existing election laws
and regulations to Internet activities. Most candidates in federal
elections now have Web sites to provide information and receive
contributions from supporters.49 In addition, many individuals create
and maintain politically motivated Web sites to advocate issues that
are close to their hearts. The FEC, in response, has been required to
determine to what extent these activities constitute "things of value"
bringing FECA into play.5" The FEC, until recently, looked at these
issues in a series of advisory opinions,51 but had not made or even
proposed a uniform rule or regulation dealing with Internet activities.
The problem with using the advisory opinion process to create a body
of federal Internet election rules is that it is difficult for individuals
and groups to know prospectively whether or not they are acting in
compliance with FECA. Because advisory opinions only make
determinations on cases with specific facts, considerable uncertainty
exists as to how the law will be applied in future similar cases.
To combat the problem of uncertainty in the law, the FEC issued
a "Notice of Inquiry 5 2 followed by a "Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking"53 outlining its approach to dealing with the new
technology. 4 There are, however, still no regulations defining the
role of the Internet community in political activities as of the 2002
election cycle.5
49. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 3; see supra notes 1 and 5 and accompanying
text.
50. See The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web
Sites of Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,359
(proposed Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117) (stating that Internet
activity in federal elections has raised issues about the applicability of FECA).
51. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
52. Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,360, 60,360 (proposed
Nov. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 102-04, 106-07, 109-10, 114, 116).
53. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations, and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 50,358.
54. The FEC's approach targets three of the most common areas of political activity
on the Internet. These areas are individual Internet activity, corporate hyperlinks, and
corporate press releases. The FEC, with only slight variation in each specific rule, adopts
a uniform approach to these three areas: a general rule of no regulation with narrowly
drawn exceptions. See id. at 50,362, 50,364-65.
55. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that the Internet is currently regulated
via a patchwork system of FEC advisory opinions).
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II. CORE ISSUES IN THE FEC's PROPOSED RULES
The Internet as an ,informational medium allowing mass
communication of political speech presents a complex puzzle for the
FEC. When enforcing the federal campaign finance laws on the
Internet, many of the realities common to political contribution do
not apply. For example, the Internet is unique in that there is
generally no incremental cost to keystrokes, e-mail, Web sites, and
hyperlinks.56 Without identifiable costs of communication, the FEC
has nothing to measure under current law.57 Limits on individual and
corporate activities on behalf of candidates are extremely hard to
interpret in the Internet context.58 In addition, the system for
disclosing political expenditures fails to consider the value of such
costless activities.59
The FEC's original stance was that, at least on their face,
Internet activities do have a cost that can be quantified and should be
considered something of value.6" Therefore, the creation and use of
Web sites for conveying political speech, or providing a link to a
candidate's Web site, would be regulated under FECA.61 However,
complete coverage of Internet activities under FECA proved to be an
unworkable solution that did not properly account for the variety of
Internet activities.62 Thus, the FEC's current stance does not attempt
to completely cover Internet activities, but rather regulates the
Internet only to the extent deemed necessary to adhere to the
56. Incremental costs are also called marginal cost. Marginal cost is the change in
total cost brought about by changing output by one unit. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (5th ed. 1998); see Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 6
(explaining the problems with measuring the cost of Internet-related activities, such as e-
mailing and typing).
57. The FEC experiences difficulties because FEC regulation has presumed that there
are identifiable costs to purchasing advertising. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 6. Also,
the FEC has been operating on the assumption that money can only be contributed by
check, a tangible medium, with a unique signature. Id.
58. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 6.
59. Id.
60. Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,360, 60,360 (proposed
Nov. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 102-04, 106-07, 109-10, 114, 116).
61. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 7.
62. "The combination of open access and relatively low cost threatens to undermine
the rationale behind the campaign finance regime." David M. Mason, Anonymity and the
Internet: Constitutional Issues in Campaign Finance Regulation, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 1999: COMPLYING WITH CAMPAIGN
FINANCE, LOBBYING AND ETHICS LAWS 11, 18 (1999).
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purpose of FECA.63 In conjunction with this approach, the FEC
made a number of decisions related to Internet political activities.
A. The Advisory Opinion Approach
Prior to 2001, the FEC determined Internet-related campaign
finance issues through advisory opinions dealing with specific cases.'
This process requires the FEC to apply federal rules and definitions
to a variety of activities by individuals and groups.6" The results of
these advisory opinions, read together, provide an overview of FEC
regulation of the Internet.
While nonpartisan activities were outside of FECA's scope, some
individuals learned through FEC opinions that their advocacy of
specific candidates on the Web was a federally regulated activity.
Corporations and labor unions, entities traditionally subject to
FECA's provisions, found that providing certain Internet services was
not a permissible activity. PACs also utilized the opinion process to
gain answers on previously unanswered questions with respect to
soliciting contributions.
1. Nonpartisan and Individual Political Web Sites
The FEC has already declared that some nonpartisan political
activity is not a contribution.66 So long as a Web site does not
expressly advocate67 the defeat or election of a federal candidate nor
solicit contributions for her political activities, it is not subject to
federal election laws. 68  In addition, offering a free link to a
candidate's Web site does not rise to the level of a contribution, so
63. Karl Sandstrom, ... And the Internet, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1999, at B7 ("In
regulating the Internet, we should seek to unleash its promise. Only such regulation as is
absolutely necessary to achieve the core purposes of the law is merited.").
64. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,359 (proposed
Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117).
65. Id.
66. Opinion for Trevor Potter, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1999-25, at http://
herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/990025.html (Oct. 29, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Trevor Potter Opinion].
67. The FEC construes any attempt by a Web site to select information skewed
towards emphasizing one campaign or party to the exclusion of others as express
advocacy. Id.
68. Opinion for Leo Smith, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1998-22, at http://
herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/980022.html (Nov. 20, 1998) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Leo Smith Opinion]. Note that even if subject to federal
election law, the federal requirements may be as minimal as providing a disclaimer and
identifying to the FEC costs associated with maintaining the site. Id.
[Vol. 81
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long as the site owner does not normally charge a fee for a site link.69
An individual can spend as much as he. wants creating a Web site to
discuss political issues, legislative issues, or public policy without
being subject to any federal election laws. 7° However, if an individual
coordinates her activities with a federal candidate's campaign, she is
making a contribution.71 In this situation, the costs of creating the
Internet site are considered when determining the individual's annual
limit.72
2. Corporations and Labor Unions
Federal election law prohibits contributions from corporations
and labor unions. Neither group can gratuitously provide Internet
services normally provided for a fee nor post candidate endorsements
on its Web site. 73 A corporation that is a news entity carrying out a
legitimate press function may publish campaign material and post
such information on the Internet since federal election law does not
concern itself with these activities.74 Lastly, a corporation engaging in
the business of assisting a campaign or PAC with its Internet activities
may continue to do so as long as the current safeguards, like charging
usual rates for services, are met.75
69. Opinion for Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No.1999-17, at
http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/990017.html (Nov. 10, 1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The FEC has since confirmed that these rules apply equally to
non-profit political groups and nonpartisan activities by for-profit companies. Opinion for
Election Zone, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No.1999-24, at http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/
ao/990024.html (Nov. 15, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
important factor, therefore, is not the economic status of the group engaging in Internet
political activity but rather the true nonpartisan nature of the information provided.
Trevor Potter Opinion, supra note 66.
70. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 9.
71. Id.
72. Leo Smith Opinion, supra note 68. Campaign volunteers are subject to different
rules regarding their Internet activities. Generally, if a volunteer incurs personal costs by
using the Internet for campaign activity those costs are not considered contributions so
long as the campaign does not control the specific volunteer activity. Potter & Jowers,
supra note 2, at 9.
73. FEC Advisory Use of Merchant ID Number to Collect Internet Contributions
Submitted for Matching Payment, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1999-22, at http://
herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/990022.html (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Use of Merchant ID Opinion]; Transmitting Endorsements to
Restricted Class Via Internet, Telephone and Voice Mail, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No.
1997-16, at http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/970016.html (Sept. 19, 1997) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Transmitting Endorsements Opinion].
74. Defining a News Entity, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1996-16, at http://
herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/960016.html (May 23, 1996) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
75. Use of Merchant ID Opinion, supra note 73.
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3. PACs
Because PACs are entities created specifically for influencing
politics and elections, they have their own set of specially crafted
rules. PACs not connected to a corporation or labor organization
may solicit contributions from the general public over the Internet.76
They may also post political information that expressly advocates the
election or defeat of a candidate as long as the expenses are
registered with the FEC.77 A corporate PAC can also engage in
political speech over the Internet, but must pay for the expense out of
contributed funds.
78
B. The Proposed Rules
Using the advisory opinion system to regulate issues of political
activities on the Internet creates a number of problems. First, the
scope of an advisory opinion is specifically limited to the factual
situation presented in each particular case.79  Therefore, it is very
difficult for an individual or group to make a prospective decision on
whether an activity will be permissible in the eyes of the FEC unless
they present a situation identical to one previously examined.80
Second, it is not efficient for the FEC to take on individual cases
when the Internet presents such a broad range of issues. Tackling
every possible election-related activity on the Internet on a case-by-
case basis would require substantial time and effort on the part of the
FEC. Because of these problems, the FEC recently proposed a set of
rules specifically designed to deal with campaign finance and other
political activities on the Web. The proposed rules purport to reduce
76. Operating a Political Committee in Cyberspace, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No.
1995-9, at http://herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/950009.html (April 21, 1995) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
77. Opinion for Michael J. Panetta, Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1999-37, at http://
herndon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/990037.html (Feb. 11, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
78. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 10.
79. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,360, 50,360 (proposed
Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117).
80. While unpredictability may exist in any court decision, the advisory opinion
system may cause some individuals to refrain from engaging in protected speech. Because
the Supreme Court has unequivocally held First Amendment protections apply both to
campaign contributions and Internet activities, it makes sense for the FEC to provide a
predictable guideline for individuals and groups to follow so that speech is not
unnecessarily obstructed. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (discussing First
Amendment protections for the Internet); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)
(noting that First Amendment protections for campaign contributions require close
scrutiny of regulators).
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the uncertainty as to which Internet activities constitute
contributions. The rules address three ,specific areas: (1) individual
Internet activities; (2) hyperlink's on corporate or labor organization
Web sites; and (3) press releases by' corporations or labor
organizations announcing endorsement of a candidate."' Because the
FEC has proposed no rules'with respect to PACs and nonpartisan
Web sites, the FEC will likely continue to use the advisory opinion
process for these areas.
1. Individuals
After reviewing the many comments it received in response to its
Notice of Inquiry, the FEC proposed a change to the current rule
with respect to individuals.82  Under the proposed rule, no
contribution would result "where an individual, without receiving
compensation, uses computer equipment, software, [or] Internet
services ... [or] engage[s] in Internet activity for the purpose of
influencing any election to federal office."83 The rule goes on to state
that this exception applies even if the individual's activity is
coordinated with a candidate, party, or campaign.' This ruling is in
stark contrast to the previous FEC stance that exempted only
nonpartisan activities from federal election regulations.85  The
proposed rule exempts from federal regulation only activities
conducted on personally owned equipment, which includes Web
browsing and hosting services from an Internet service provider
pursuant to an agreement, not activities conducted on public
equipment, employer owned equipment, or equipment owned by any
other person. Pursuant to the rule, any costs incurred by the
individual or efforts made by the individual would not count toward
contribution limits to candidates or parties.
81. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg at 50,361.
82. See id. at 50,362.
83. Id. Note that "personally owned" Internet services include Web hosting and
Internet connection services provided to the individual through an ISP. Id.
84. Id.
85. Under previous opinions, partisan activities of individuals were deemed
contributions. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that advocacy for the
defeat or election of a federal candidate or solicitation of campaign contributions through
the Internet subjects an individual to federal election laws). One limitation on the FEC's
contribution rule, in contrast with previous FEC regulations, is that individuals lose the
benefit of this exception if they use any equipment, services, or software owned by their
employer, even if the individual is using them as part of a volunteer activity. The Internet
and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of Individuals,
Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 50,362.
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According to the FEC, the reason for this change is to allow
individuals to "engage in a significant amount of election-related
Internet activity" without being subject to FECA.8 6 Because these
activities do not count as contributions, they would not count toward
an individual's contribution limit, disclosure would be unnecessary,
and no disclaimer would be required.87 This regulatory shift appears
to be in line with the general federal point of view that the Internet
should continue to develop unobstructed." However, the rule still
must be analyzed in light of Reno v. ACLU 89 to determine whether it
creates other First Amendment issues.
The first step in analyzing the FEC's proposed rule regarding
individuals is to determine if it meets the constitutional mandate
announced in Reno. In general, the FEC rule seems to raise little
issue when it comes to constitutionality. Reno requires a "hands-off"
approach to the Internet, and the FEC rule with respect to individuals
provides a complete exemption from the definition of contribution
for Internet activities, which complies with this mandate.9" A
problem arises, however, when looking more closely at the rule. The
rule only exempts activities of individuals who use their own
equipment and software.9' This limitation means that an individual
can only engage in political activity on the Internet if he can afford to
own a computer and pay for Internet service. It also precludes the
use of libraries and other publicly available Internet sources.92 For
the Supreme Court to hold that the unqualified First Amendment
86. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 50,362.
87. Id.
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2001) (stating that the free market on the Internet should
remain "unfettered by Federal and State Regulations"). Congress found that the rapid
development of the Internet is likely because of the hands-off approach of the
government. § 230(a)(4).
89. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
90. See id. at 870 (stating that First Amendment protections for the Internet are
unqualified); The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web
Sites of Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 50,362
(explaining which individual activities are exempt from FECA's contribution definition).
91. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed Reg. at 50,362.
92. See Letter from Laurence E. Gold, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO, to
Rosemary C. Smith, Assistance General Counsel, Federal Election Commission 2 (Dec.
31, 2001) (stating that the proposed rule implies that individual use of the Internet on
library, community center, or learning institution equipment does not fit within the
exception to "contribution"), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/use-of internet/
internet rule comments/aflcio.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter AFL-CIO Comment].
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protection stated in Reno93 is subject to an economic exception is
unlikely.
In addition, the proposed FEC rules except from the non-
contribution policy any activities conducted on an employer's
equipment.94 This exception again seems to contradict the holding in
Reno that the Internet receives full First Amendment protection.
This provision of the rules may be saved, however, by looking at the
rationale of the Supreme Court in Reno. The crux of the Court's
decision was that the Internet is not like radio or television." If an
employee is using company equipment to engage in Internet
activities, that use and Internet content is most likely monitored by
the company.96 This is analogous to a television network. Once the
individual submits to the directives of an employer, her speech on the
Internet is less like a person talking to others in a room, and more
like a television program that has been approved by the network.
Notwithstanding the possible constitutional problems
surrounding the rule, the FEC's approach to Internet regulation
creates other difficulties for individuals wishing to engage in political
speech. If we assume that the rule is constitutional, and that some
individual activity is going to be reported to the FEC, the federal
regulation has taken away one of the basic aspects of the Internet-
anonymity. The Internet medium disrupts current mechanisms
requiring adequate information identifying a political speaker's
identity.97 Authors have many valid reasons for writing anonymously,
including avoiding retaliation and ostracism and maintaining
privacy." Internet speakers tend to be diverse individuals who often
have no notice that federal election laws extend to their activities.99
By requiring Internet activists to report expenditures or
93. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
94. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. at 50,362.
95. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69.
96. See Editorial, Give Workers a Warning... You Have (Monitored) Mail, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, at 10B (citing American Management study that found
that over half of employers monitor Internet use) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
97. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 6.
98. Center for Democracy and Technology, Comment on Proposed Rulemaking,
Square Pegs & Round Holes: Applying Campaign Finance Law to the Internet; Risks to
Free Expression & Democratic Values 17, at http://www.cdt.org/speech/political/
campaignfinance.pdf (Oct. 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter CDT Comment] (responding to the FEC's notice of proposed rulemaking).
99. Id. In contrast, before the Internet, speakers were generally large, well-organized
groups, campaigns, parties, or candidates that were all familiar with election laws.
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contributions, thereby disclosing their identities,' 0 the FEC may
inhibit certain individuals from engaging in political speech. In the
case of Web sites operated by individuals, identification of a
contributing author will do very little in helping visitors understand
the content of the site.10' By revoking the anonymity of individuals,
and thereby reducing the number of individuals engaging in political
debate on the Internet, the FEC's proposed rule actually contradicts
many of the goals of federal election law-equalizing political
influence, improving and diversifying political debate, and increasing
the competitiveness of elections.0 2
By compromising an individual's ability to make political speech
by revoking anonymity, the FEC has run afoul of the Supreme
Court's mandate regarding federal election laws announced in
Buckley. Buckley upheld contribution limitations because restrictions
on amounts donated, while restraining political expression evidenced
by outward support of a political party or candidate, do not deprive
individuals of the freedom to discuss candidates or the issues. 03
Further, in McIntyre v. Ohio"° the Supreme Court held that it is
unconstitutional to force anonymous speakers to reveal their
identities.0 5 The Court stated that the name associated with a piece
of constitutionally protected speech is of the same nature as any other
statement contained in that speech.06 With respect to both, the
author has the freedom to include or not include in protected First
Amendment speech whatever information he or she desires.17
100. See Lee Smith Opinion, supra note 68.
101. CDT Comment, supra note 98, at 18.
102. Id. But in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court specifically
rejected these rationales of the campaign finance laws. Buckley stated that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 649.
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29. The Supreme Court went on to state that contribution
ceilings adversely affect campaigns by restricting political associations with individuals and
groups. Id. at 39. The Court held, however, that the contribution limitations did not
reduce the amount of money available to candidates, but merely required candidates to
raise funds from a greater number of people. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that since
persons who wished to donate amounts in excess of the contribution ceilings could spend
that money on direct political speech, their First Amendment freedoms were not unduly
restricted. Id at 29.
104. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
105. Id. at 357. The Court held that the state did not have a sufficiently compelling
interest in either producing relevant election-related information or decreasing fraudulent
and libelous material to allow abrogation of the First Amendment. Id.
106. Id. at 348.
107. Id.
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Consequently, an FEC rule that may require individuals to
disclose biographical information violates the reasoning in McIntyre.
The FEC's interest in making the names associated with political
expression public is not sufficiently compelling to allow the basic
premise of the First Amendment to be undermined. In McIntyre, the
Court held that no public interest in having an author's name
disclosed is sufficient to outweigh the benefit of having those ideas
enter the marketplace. 108 While McIntyre specifically spoke of books,
pamphlets, and other literary works, 109 there is no reason to find an
exception for the Internet, even though Internet publication is
electronic. Especially in the political arena, where one is dealing with
controversial issues that invoke the passions of the masses, one may
often find it important to remain nameless. For example, James
Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, writers of the Federalist
Papers, found it necessary to write under the name "Publius" when
advocating for the passage of the United States Constitution."' While
publishing these essays in New York newspapers, Madison, Jay, and
Hamilton kept their identities a well-guarded secret."' Anonymity
was required for "Publius" to effectively fulfill his political purpose-
to speak to the small audience of established, powerful men to
convince them of the need for governmental change.12 Madison, Jay,
and Hamilton felt their audience might not listen if their names
affixed to the message." 3
As the previous discussion regarding the rules for individual
Internet activity illustrates, it appears that the FEC's proposed rules
run afoul of the First Amendment."l4  In addition, the rules for
individuals seem to contradict many of the reasons for the existence
of campaign contribution regulation. First, the Internet allows
individuals without money to contribute in support of their
candidates and to participate in shaping the issues for the next
108. Id. at 342. The Court stated that some authors fear economic retaliation, social
ostracism, and possible government retaliation that could cause an author to not publish
her ideas if publication required attaching her name. Limitations on free expression could
therefore occur in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 341-42.
109. Id. at 341.
110. See Robert Scigliano, Editor's Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at vii-ix (Robert
Scigliano ed., 2000).
111. Id. at viii.
112. Id. at viii-ix.
113. Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at ix (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing Hamilton's political efforts and how writing the papers anonymously
supplemented his bullying style).
114. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing how rules violate Reno's
hands-off approach to the Internet by putting qualifications on individual use).
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election. These activities can level the playing field between well-
financed candidates and those without considerable financial
backing.115 Second, allowing individuals to post information on the
Internet will increase the diversity of the information on candidates
and political parties available to the public. Increasing information
may improve the quality of the electoral debate and require
candidates to answer, even if informally, to a wider section of the
population. Finally, by allowing individuals to be heard on the
Internet, participation in federal elections is likely to increase as more
people get involved and as more information becomes available." 6
2. Hyperlinks on Corporate or Labor Union Web Sites
Because FECA generally prohibits corporations and labor
unions from publicly advocating on behalf of any federal candidate,
Web sites of these entities cannot post that type of information."7
But as the Notice of Inquiry stated, providing a hyperlink to a
candidate, PAC, party, or the like may also be something of value
that would be limited by FECA's contribution requirements." 8 The
problem with attempting to regulate hyperlinks, according to both the
FEC and various commentators, is that the cost of providing a
hyperlink, which in turn would be the "value" of the contribution, is
often de minimis or non-existent." 9 Furthermore, it is difficult to see
how a hyperlink contains any substantive content. Some
commentators argue that hyperlinks merely "present an option" for
online traffic that does not advocate the substance of the target site.
Without substantive content, a hyperlink may not be a contribution
115. Terry M. Neal, Candidates Hang Hopes on Electronic Hustlings, WASH. POST,
Apr. 26, 1999, at A3 (discussing the evolution of the Internet in political campaigns). Jesse
Ventura's win in the 1998 race for governor of Minnesota is the most notable case of the
Internet turning the tide of an election. Ventura used the Internet to mobilize 3,000 votes
in the last 72 hours of his campaign which helped him win the election. Id. But see supra
note 104 (discussing how Buckley v. Valeo held that equalizing the relative voices in the
marketplace is an impermissible purpose for campaign finance laws).
116. Esther Dyson, Release 3.0 Polls Make Strange Webfellows, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2000, at C3 (stating that the Internet will help more people get involved in government
just like it helped people get involved in business).
117. Potter & Jowers, supra note 2, at 10.
118. See Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,362 (proposed
Nov. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 102-04, 106-07, 109-10, 114, 116).
119. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,363 (proposed
Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117).
120. Id.
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or expenditure and would also not be express advocacy by the
corporation or labor union in support of a candidate.
121
To address the issue of hyperlinks, the FEC's proposed new
section 117.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations states that providing
a hyperlink to a candidate or party Web site by a corporation or labor
union would not be considered a contribution or expenditure under
FECA12  In order to be exempt, however, the hyperlink must meet
three criteria: (1) the corporation or union charges no or only a
nominal fee to provide the link; (2) the hyperlink-is not coordinated
with general political communication under FEC rules; and (3) a
hyperlink anchored to visual material cannot expressly advocate for a
party or candidate. 23
At first glance, it may appear that FEC regulation of
corporations is unconstitutional for the same reasons as the rules
regarding individuals. 124 By placing qualifications on a corporation's
ability to have a hyperlink on its Web site, the FEC rules restrict
speech on the Internet, which is prohibited under a broad reading of
Reno. Reno, however, was concerned with the possibility that
Internet regulation would in essence be gagging individuals, thus
prohibiting free exchange of ideas . 2  The Reno Court took issue with
the CDA because it silenced some speakers whose messages were
protected by the First Amendment.126 In the case of political speech
by corporations, however, it has already been established that
corporate speech, through contributions or otherwise, advocating for
a candidate or party may be limited by federal law . 2  The reason for
121. Id.
122. See id. at 50,363.
123. Id. In addition, any text surrounding the hyperlink is forbidden from expressly
advocating on behalf of a candidate or party. Id. Note also that the text of a URL (the
textual address for an Internet Web site) is not limited by the express advocacy
prohibition. Id.
124. See supra notes 89-96.
125. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the CDA suppressed
some speech that is protected by the First Amendment).
126. Id.
127. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000) (prohibiting federally chartered banks and
corporations from making political contributions); Corporate and Labor Organization
Activity, 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a) (2002) (prohibiting contributions by banks and corporations
with federal charters in connection with federal, state, or local elections and prohibiting
contributions by any corporation or labor union in a federal election). The
constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting unions from making contributions to
federal campaigns has been upheld. U.S. v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). However, these bans are unconstitutional when applied to
not-for-profit non-stock corporations. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
263 (1986).
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these restrictions was stated in Buckley v. Valeo,12s where the
Supreme Court held that limiting "the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions
129
was a compelling state interest justifying contribution limitations and
other advocacy restrictions.130
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that corporations
do not enjoy any First Amendment protections; corporations do
enjoy freedom of speech.3 Corporations are allowed to expend
money for the purpose of affecting the outcome of a vote on any issue
before voters.3 2 Therefore, the hyperlink restrictions are most likely
protected only if the FEC can maintain them as restrictions on direct
contributions to candidates or parties.
Many commentators on the FEC's proposed rules have
maintained that hyperlinks are not subject to contribution restrictions
because they are not "anything of value." '133 The commentators
mainly argue that because a corporation does not generally spend any
money to place a hyperlink on a corporate Web site, the hyperlink is
not a gift of value."3 Furthermore, the placement of a hyperlink on a
corporate Web site does not necessarily increase the value of the
linked site.'35 The proposed FEC regulations implicitly accept this
argument by only restricting hyperlinks in limited situations.
While placing a hyperlink on a Web site does not necessarily
result in dollar expenditures, the link may still have value to both the
corporation and the linked site in an economic sense. The economic
value of something is measured in terms of how much someone is
willing to pay for it, not by how much it actually costs.'3 6 The true
meaning of "value" is especially significant when defining
128. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id. In a later case, the Supreme Court identified the compelling state interest as
preventing corruption stemming from the influence of corporate political war chests.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990).
131. See Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978). (holding that
nothing in the First Amendment stands for the proposition that speech loses First
Amendment protection simply because it came from a corporation).
132. See id. at 793-95 (rendering unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting corporate
expenditures for the purpose of influencing a public vote on a question not materially
affecting the business).
133. See The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web
Sites of Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,363
(proposed Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117) (noting that thirty
commentators believed hyperlinks do not add value to a Web site).
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. POSNER, supra note 56, at 12.
[Vol. 81
ELECTION LAW AND THE INTERNET
contribution because FECA specifically enumerates monetary
expenditures but also contains "anything of value" as a catch-all.137 If
FECA was only meant to cover dollars spent, there would be no
reason to include the "anything of value" language. A hyperlink to
his or her campaign Web site is something that a candidate would find
highly desirable and would likely pay measurable dollar amounts to
have.138  Likewise, the corporation expects to benefit by increased
traffic to the campaign Web sites of the candidates that it supports,
increasing the likelihood of success on election day. Because the
corporation expects to benefit from the election of the candidates it
supports,39 the link has significant economic value.
How the FEC would enforce hyperlink restrictions as a practical
matter is not clear. The FEC will be forced to rely on the same tools
employed to enforce the other provisions of FECA. These tools
include audits of political campaigns (to ensure compliance with
FECA) and complaints alleging violations.4 ' Apparently, the FEC
believes it can monitor hyperlinks on the Internet, as monitoring is
necessary to supervise compliance with the restrictions on
hyperlinks. 4' Whether the FEC is monitoring its proposed
restrictions or enforcing a ban on corporate hyperlinks (as this
Comment argues) the FEC must police the Internet to some extent-
137. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000) (defining the term "contribution" with respect to
corporations and labor unions).
138. A hyperlink will increase the number of hits a Web site gets because of the ease
with which the Web site is accessed. The Internet user does not have to expend any
energy actually locating the site because free transportation to the site is given by merely
clicking on the link.
139. The fact that corporations expect to derive benefit from the election of the
candidates they support is the basis for FECA's prohibitions against corporation activity.
See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). In Austin,
the Supreme Court construed Michigan's campaign finance act similarly to FECA. Id.
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the act, again finding that corporate wealth,
when used for campaign contributions or expenditures, can unfairly influence elections.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the possibility of corruption of our political system
through corporate contributions and expenditures in federal elections is a compelling
interest sufficient to abrogate corporations' freedom of expression. Id. at 659.
140. See Trevor Potter, Enforcing Spending Limits in Congressional Elections: Can the
FEC Do the Job?, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 16, at 332, 333 (arguing
the FEC does not have the resources necessary to enforce FECA successfully).
141. Many commentators argue that the FEC, in its current form, is not capable of
adequate enforcement of iny of FECA's provisions. See Brooks Jackson, Fixing the FEC:
Suggestions for Change: Fulfilling the Promise, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra
note 16, at 315, 315-22; Brooks Jackson, The Case of the Kidnapped Agency: Wayne Hays
and 'Scared Rats': Designed to Fail, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 16, at
281, 281-89; Potter, supra note 142, at 332-34; Trevor Potter, With Changes the FEC Can
Be Effective, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 16, at 323, 323-26. The
adequacy of the FEC as a governmental agency is outside the scope of this Comment.
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an arduous task. While it may be easier from an enforcement point of
view to have no regulation of hyperlinks, simplicity alone cannot
counter the argument that providing a link is a valuable service that
corporations should not be allowed to contribute to political
campaigns under FECA.
Because hyperlinks have significant economic value, they do in
fact fit within the code definition of a contribution or expenditure-
they are something of value intended to influence a federal
election. 42 Therefore, these Internet activities do in fact fall under
the broad scope of FECA and the regulations of the FEC. The FEC
can enact rules and make policy with respect to these Internet devices
so long as it adheres to the constitutional limitations on FECA as set
out in Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent cases.
3. Press Releases
FECA allows corporations and labor unions to endorse
candidates.143 The corporation or union is allowed to make a press
release concerning an endorsement as long as the release is only
distributed to members of the news media to which the corporation
or union customarily releases information. 144  The new FEC
regulation would also permit press releases concerning candidate
endorsement on a corporate Web site so long as four conditions are
met.145  First, the corporation must generally make press releases
available on its Web site. 46 Second, the press release must be limited
to announcement of the endorsement and its supporting reasons.1
47
Third, the press release must be made available in the same manner
as other press releases on the Web site. 48 Fourth, the cost of making
a press release available on the Web site must be de minimis. 49 This
rule allows the press release to be made available to the general
142. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (providing the definition of contribution with respect
to individuals); § 431(9)(A) (providing the definition of expenditure with respect to
individuals); id. § 441b(b)(2) (providing the definition of contribution with respect to
corporations and labor unions).
143. Disbursements for communications beyond the restricted class in connection with
a Federal election, 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(6) (2002).
144. § 114.4(c)(6)(i).
145. The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of
Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,365 (proposed
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public and not just the corporation's restricted class or members of
the media.
The FEC rules respecting press releases are likely constitutional
because they are less restrictive than the previously accepted
regulations on providing information on candidate endorsement. 10
The new rules allow wide dissemination freely to the general public,
and the four restrictions are merely content-neutral speech
regulations that do not contradict the First Amendment. These
neutral restrictions merely limit speech without regard to the content
of that speech.151 Content neutral restrictions can be anything from
billboard restrictions and bans on loudspeakers to the limits on
campaign contributions imposed by FECA.152  The restrictions,
however, can interfere with individuals' ability to speak freely. As
this interference becomes more apparent, courts employ increasingly
difficult standards of review to ensure that government regulations do
not chill protected speech.153  Just because the rules pass
constitutional muster, however, does not force a conclusion that the
rules adequately resolve the issue of Internet regulation under FECA.
The proposed rules do not go far enough in protecting the core
principles of FECA: reducing the impact of money on political
campaigns, preventing corruption and undue influence in the election
process, and improving the quality and .competitiveness of the
election process.15 4 In contrast, the aggregate effect of the hands-off
approach by the FEC is to allow increased corporate contribution to
the campaigning of federal election candidates. This result is in direct
opposition to the purpose of FECA which is to reduce the
appearance of corruption in federal elections.'55
C. Proposed Rules: Not Enough to Properly Restrict Corporate and
Labor Union Activity
Most of the opposition to the FEC rule relating to hyperlinks in
its proposed form is based on the premise that a hyperlink is cost-free
150. Prior to proposed 11 C.F.R. § 117.3, the FEC only allowed candidate
endorsements to be posted on a corporation's Web site if access to that endorsement was
limited to the corporation's restricted class using a password or other method. See
Transmitting Endorsements Opinion, supra note 73. The proposed regulation permits
release of the endorsement to the general public on the Web site, which is a significantly
less restrictive provision.
151. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1234 (Aspen 4th ed. 2001).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 1364.
154. See CDT Comment, supra note 98, at 10-11.
155. See supra note 12.
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to provide and therefore is not something of value. 56 According to
the AFL-CIO, "[a] link is inherently cost-free to provide, access and
use, in contrast to other website content" that requires "measurable
design costs and personnel resources." '157 The AFL-CIO argues that a
link is nothing more than giving a candidate's address to an
individual.158 Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, a group advocating for American businesses, describes the
Internet as a forum where "speech is cheap" and posting only
"involves minimal costs."'59 These interest groups believe that when
the costs of using an informational medium are nearly insignificant,
the government's role in preventing corruption (one main goal of
election laws) also becomes insignificant. 60
These commentators argue that the rules are a step in the right
direction-towards deregulation-but do not go nearly far enough.''
The commentators urge the FEC to adopt a totally hands-off
approach that will not raise "numerous practical difficulties for
corporations."' 62  The commentators thus are apparently not
concerned as much with the FEC's goal of providing fair elections as
with possible hindrances to corporate advocacy. These commentators
are also concerned with the FEC's ability to enforce these regulations
based on the overwhelming number of Web sites and the constantly
changing nature of the Internet 63 If the FEC is constantly tracking
information on the Web, the commentators fear that enforcement
power will be reduced in all other areas, allowing some illegal activity
to go unnoticed and unpunished. 6
156. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Comment, supra note 92, at 3 (providing reasons why a
hyperlink does not constitute anything of value).
157. Id.; see also Letter from Jan Witold Baran, Counsel to Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, Wiley Rein & Fielding, LLP, to Rosemary C. Smith, Assistant General
Counsel, Federal Election Commission 8-9 (Dec. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Chamber of
Commerce Comment], available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/use-ofinternet/internet_
rulecomments/uschamber of commrc.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
158. AFL-CIO Comment, supra note 92, at 3.
159. Chamber of Commerce Comment, supra note 157, at 8 (quoting The Internet and
Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web Sites of Individuals, Corporations
and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,358, 50,362 (proposed Oct. 3, 2001) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117)).
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 10-11.
162. Id. at 11.
163. See AFL-CIO Comment, supra note 92, at 6. The AFL-CIO also fears that
enforcement of Internet activities will create incentives to file frivolous complaints simply
for harassment purposes since the dollar amounts at issue are relatively small. Id.
164. Id.
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With respect to the rules restricting corporate press releases, the
commentators find similar problems. The AFL-CIO argued that
corporations and unions should be free to post Internet press releases
(as the FEC's proposed rules allow) without the "unduly restrictive"
qualifications of the proposed regulation.'65 The basis of their
argument, again, is that the cost of Internet posting is "typically
negligible at most." '166 Because corporate and union Web sites are
almost exclusively used to post non-election related content, only the
minimal incremental costs of putting the press release online should
be counted under the application of FECA.167 The AFL-CIO
analogizes the situation to FEC approved rules that allow
corporations and unions to hold press conferences168 or candidate
appearances16 9 to announce endorsement of a candidate for a federal
election. Because these permissible activities produce "potentially
far-reaching and potent communication," they are similar to an
Internet posting of the endorsement information which should
likewise be free of any conditions precedent.170
The analogy presented by the AFL-CIO, however, is not the
proper analogy. The press release and press conference regulations
only allow members of a corporation's restricted class and the media
to be present. In order for the endorsement to become a "far-
reaching potent communication" the media must first determine that
the endorsement is a newsworthy event-public knowledge is shaped
by how the media decides to cover the event. 7' The Internet, in
contrast, provides the corporation unfiltered access to the public, a
wholly different situation, of which the FEC should be (and probably
is) far more concerned. So long as the Internet election regulations
on corporations and unions are deemed constitutional, the FEC
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Disbursements for communications beyond the restricted class in connection
with a Federal election, 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(6)(i) (2002). Notice of a press conference
must be limited to the corporation or union's customary press list for other purposes and
the cost of the conference must be de minimis. Id.
169. See Disbursements for communications to the restricted class in connection with a
Federal election, 11 C.F.R. § 114.3(c)(2) (2002). If the event is open to the press, all news
media representatives must be given equal access. § 114.3(c)(2)(iv). Generally speaking,
a candidate may only appear before the restricted class of the union or corporation. See
§ 114.3(c)(2)(i).
170. AFL-CIO Comment, supra note 92, at 5.
171. See Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1061, 1072-73 (1994) (arguing that media coverage shapes the Supreme Court
nomination process).
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should not feel compelled to relax its stance on this issue. In this case,
the arguments supporting a completely unregulated approach do not
withstand close scrutiny.
Unlike the rules with respect to individuals, the FEC's proposals
do not go far enough in controlling corporate and labor union
Internet activities. The current FEC approach, as noted by the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, presents a "piece-meal
approach," which "leaves many questions about corporate and labor
union Internet-based political activity unanswered."' 72 In contrast to
the Chamber's suggestion that the FEC adopt a comprehensive
deregulation policy towards the Internet,'73 a strong argument exists
that the FEC's rules do not go far enough in enacting campaign
finance reform.
In constructing this argument, it should first be noted that
regulation of the Internet by FEC rules respecting corporate
regulation will likely not result in hindering the development of the
Internet as an information medium. Hindering Internet development
was one of the main concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in
Reno. Since it does not appear that FEC regulation in this area is
unconstitutional,174 hindrance of Internet development seems to be
the only remaining rationale for obstructing the FEC's campaign
finance rulemaking. In the present case, corporations cannot
maintain Web sites advocating for a candidate, or place content on
their own Web sites advocating for a candidate. 7 ' Additional rules,
therefore, will only restrict links between corporate information
available on the Internet and campaign information. The amount of
content available to the public will not be increased or diminished
regardless of the FEC's approach. Therefore, when dealing with
corporation and union activity, the FEC should not be limited in how
it chooses to attack this new medium of information.
The commentators opposing the FEC's role in regulating the
Internet only point to the marginal cost (in dollars), not the actual
value to the candidate of a corporation advocating on its behalf.'76 As
172. Chamber of Commerce Comment, supra note 157, at 1-2.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (noting that corporate speech in
the political arena can be restricted).
175. See Use of Merchant ID Opinion, supra note 73; Transmitting Endorsements
Opinion, supra note 73.
176. See The Internet and Federal Elections; Candidate-Related Materials on Web
Sites of Individuals, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg., 50,358, 50,363
(proposed Oct. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100, 114, 117) (summarizing
comment that FECA only prohibits "measurable monetary sums" and that the Internet
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previously discussed, this is not an accurate way to depict whether or
not Internet activities have "value" under FECA.77 In addition,
there are two reasons why these commentators fail to accurately
depict the value of these Internet activities and the need for FEC
involvement: the value of all Internet activity together is greater than
the costs to create and maintain it and this value depends on the
corporation engaging in the activity.
First, when the benefits of a hyperlink and Internet press release
are added together, the sum is greater than the cost of the parts.
Taken together, these two Internet postings advocate for a candidate
by the corporation or union, provide the address to receive
information on the candidate, and transport customers to the virtual
headquarters of the candidate where that candidate's positions are
expressed in a partisan manner, just as if the candidate's Web site is
embedded in the corporation's site. When viewed in this fashion, it is
hard to argue that the value of these items is "de minimis." In
contrast, the postings are a direct grant to the candidate of something
with economic value, that is, something that a candidate would pay a
significant price to receive. The provisions of FECA are designed to
stop these types of contributions by corporations and labor unions.'78
For the FEC to meet its obligations under FECA, it must prevent this
type of activity.'79
Second, even if hyperlinks and press release postings involve no
cost to the corporation providing them, they have independent value
depending on the corporation conducting the activity. One of the
reasons for campaign finance regulation is to help level the playing
field so that large monetary contributions do not effect elections in a
way that mutes the voices of the citizenry at large. 80 Preventing
corporations from contributing to specific federal candidates is part of
the system that tries to keep money from influencing elections as
much as possible. 8' Corporation contributions are also prohibited
because the Supreme Court believed that corporations that are able
to donate large sums of money to a candidate will be able to unduly
does not involve this type of sum). See also id. at 50,362-63 (summarizing comments that
posting information on the Internet only involves minimal cost and that hyperlinks "cost
next to nothing to create").
177. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
178. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2000).
179. See id. § 437c(b)(1).
180. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales for campaign
finance laws and the Supreme Court's response to these rationales).
181. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
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influence that candidate's activities in Washington.182  Many
commentators have argued that deregulation of Internet activities by
corporations is therefore appropriate because big and small
corporations can engage in Internet advocacy without expending
large amounts of money."3 The idea is that the Internet inherently
levels the playing field for corporations. A simple example shows
why this is not the case. In the fourth quarter of 2001, Amazon.com
had roughly 43,240,000 unique visitors to its Web site."8' Even other
well-known retail chains cannot come close to that amount of
traffic.'85 It is clear from this statistic that a hyperlink placed on
Amazon.com, a giant Internet corporation, will be viewed, and likely
used, more than a hyperlink on other corporate Web sites. Small,
local, or regional business sites may not be visited as many times in
their entire lifetime as Amazon.com is visited in one quarter. A
candidate for federal election would therefore view a hyperlink from
Amazon.com as a much more important gift to her campaign than a
hyperlink from a smaller company. Not only does the hyperlink have
economic value, but the value differs based on who is providing the
link. The Internet is not the great equalizer that many of the
commentators to the FEC have claimed it to be. Rather, the Internet
is as unequal a playing field as any in corporate America.
The notion that Internet activities by corporations do not serve
to enhance available election-related information is contrary to the
earlier arguments with respect to individuals. Corporations, however,
are fundamentally different from individuals and have been treated as
such during the entire existence of FECA. Corporations are given
state-created advantages like limited liability, perpetual life, and
favorable asset accumulation and distribution treatment. 86
Corporations utilize these advantages to obtain favorable positions in
the national economy.'87 These same advantages can be used to
182. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (describing FECA as attempting
to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption that is spawned by the coercive
influence of large financial contributions). A central purpose of FECA is to avoid this
type of corruption. CDT Comment, supra note 98, at 10.
183. CDT Comment, supra note 98, at 10.
184. Michael Totty & Ann Grimes, If at First You Don't Succeed..., WALL ST. J., Feb.
11, 2002, at R6. Amazon.com is generally the benchmark for retail-based Web sites. Id.
185. For example, PotteryBarn.com only had 381,000 unique visitors in the fourth
quarter of 2001. Id.
186. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990).
187. Id. at 659. Here, the Supreme Court cited its earlier holding in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The Court held in Massachusetts
Citizens that resources in a corporation's treasury do not reflect popular support for that
corporation's political ideas, but rather the economically motivated choices of investors
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obtain unequal positions of influence in the political arena.1"'
Therefore, the Supreme Court has found a compelling governmental
interest in preventing corruption that warrants restriction of political
organizations funded by corporations. 89 Large Internet corporations
also use radio and television advertisements to increase the traffic to
their Web sites. These advertisements help further solidify the
placement of larger Internet corporations as the main attractions on
the Web, and therefore the most desirable place for a candidate to
place a hyperlink.
As the foregoing examples show, the Internet provides as many
opportunities for corruption as traditional dollar contributions.
Because the Internet can provide a similar ground for breeding
corruption, the FEC cannot adopt a hands-off approach to Internet
activities. The FEC needs to think prospectively. At some point in
the future it is conceivable that phone, television, and Internet will all
be integrated into a single medium.19 ° Furthermore, the Internet is
rapidly becoming not only a source of election-related information,
but also a place to cast one's vote.'9' It will be much easier for the
FEC to apply FECA's principles to the Internet at its infancy as
opposed to embracing a laissez-faire policy and then being forced to
interject itself in the future as the technology evolves. By adopting a
regulatory policy now, as the Internet develops, the FEC will be able
to alter its policy as changes in technology dictate.'92 To change
and customers. Id. at 258. These resources, though not supporting a political position,
make corporations formidable political forces, even though public support for those ideas
is nonexistent. Id.
188. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
189. Id.
190. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Peter S. Goodman, The Latest Line on the Net: AOL
and Other Firms Are Betting on Telephony, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,2000, at El.
191. See Ben White, The Cyber Stump; The Web Provides a Closer Link Between
Candidates and Voters, WASH. POST, May 17, 2000, at G18. In Arizona, binding primary
elections have already occurred on the Web. Id.
192. It must be conceded that enforcement of a policy dealing with the Internet will be
incredibly difficult. Tracking express advocacy on the Web will prove very costly for the
FEC because of the infinite size and breadth of the Internet. AFL-CIO Comment, supra
note 92, at 6. The AFL-CIO also fears the possibility that frivolous complaints could be
lodged against corporations and labor unions merely to block their ability to engage in
lawful political activity. Id. The economic response to this argument is that the FEC
should make the penalty for violations so high that it would be irrational for a corporation
to engage in any unlawful activity. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-86 (1989) (noting that economic models suggest such a policy
will in fact deter some socially desirable activities). The FEC, however, has no
independent authority to impose penalties. In order for Internet regulations to be
properly enforced, FEC reform is absolutely necessary. Because this topic has been
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corporate activity after the FEC had it allowed to persist for a
significant period of time would prove much more difficult.193
CONCLUSION
The Internet will forever be a part of political activity and federal
elections in the United States. This Comment argues that Internet
activities easily impart value to political candidates, whether or not
the amount of those activities is clearly measured in dollars and cents.
Any difficulty in calculating value is not a proper excuse for ignoring
the campaign finance rules.
The FEC, through its regulations, should provide maximum
protection for election-related speech on the Internet. The free
expression made possible by the Internet is a valuable tool for
individuals to voice their opinions on issues and candidates. The
Supreme Court has made clear that the Internet is a marketplace that
receives full First Amendment protection.'94 Any regulations that
make it more difficult (or impossible) to take part in this exchange of
ideas violate the First Amendment.
The same is not true with respect to corporations, entities
traditionally prohibited from contributing to federal campaigns.'95
Adopting a laissez-faire policy towards all Internet activities of
corporations presents a dangerous situation. By accepting the fiction
that Internet activity has no value, the FEC may allow unfettered
corporate involvement in elections that may increase the possibility
for undue influence. To the contrary, Internet activities by
corporations have significant economic value, measured by the
amount a candidate would be willing to pay for corporate aid, not
how much it actually costs. The FEC should make its prohibitions on
corporate contributions more stringent, or at least maintain them, in
thoroughly discussed in other scholarly articles, this Comment will not consider this issue.
For articles on FEC reform, see CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 16, at 275-334.
193. Corporations are often extremely successful in getting Congress to ratify their
positions with respect to their industry. For example, when Travelers/Salomon Smith
Barney merged with Citicorp National Bank, it formed an illegal conglomerate under
existing banking laws. Citigroup (the new company's name), instead of using its five-year
grace period to divest itself of illegal holdings, successfully pushed Congress to adopt the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Banking Act, which allowed national banks to hold insurance
companies and securities firms. Act of November 12, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1385; see Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, A By-product of the Globalization
Process: The Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions-The U.S. Regulatory
Framework, 56 BUS. LAW. 591, 624 n.147 (2001).
194. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,870 (1997).
195. See supra notes 127-30.
[Vol. 81
2003] ELECTION LAW AND THE INTERNET 727
order to help contain the political influence held by corporations at
the top levels of government.
The FEC must adhere to the principles of FECA in order to
ensure that elected officials fulfill their obligation to properly
represent the interests of the American public.
RYAN L. BLAINE
